4 the formation of the ECSC. 12 Crucially, Monnet did not have a clear institutional, let alone federalist, vision. Rather, he sought to limit government and industry influence over the sector's European governance mainly drawing on the notion of 'supranationalism' to strengthen the High Authority's claims to executive autonomy.
The second element concerns close transnational industry cooperation. Steel was crucial for national industrialisation, warfare and reconstruction with limited integration of companies and markets across borders. It was also highly sensitive to the general business cycle and very capital-intensive, resulting in a strong collective preference for stable conditions for trade and investment. From the 1880s onwards steel companies sought to foster such stability through the formation of transnational cartels culminating in the interwar European and International Steel Cartels. 13 Raw material interdependence including French interest in German coal and
German dependence on French iron ore from the Lorraine region constituted an additional incentive for industry cooperation. In the ECSC, despite the industry's initial scepticism about
Monnet's intentions, 14 officials in the High Authority and national governments close to the industry and its representatives in the Consultative Committee continued cartel and neocorporatist concertation practices.
Drawing on fresh research in national and international organisation archives, the article's first two sections traces the genealogy of both governance practices until 1945. The third section analyses continuities into the post-war Western European governance of the steel sector and how the two practices clashed, became amalgamated and impacted on the ECSC and Western European integration more generally, with strong repercussions for the evolution of the present-day EU.
Executive Decision-Making in War and Peace

5
When the ECSC was founded in 1951-52, several factors shaped its origins. They included national experiences like Monnet's with the limits of his nationally focussed modernization plan, 15 and international influences, especially the institutional and economic policy preferences of the United States government and private American actors. 16 Technocratic internationalism had long since created a long-term trajectory for transnational practices, however, which shaped the thinking and actions of many key actors. In the case of Monnet, Crucially, this set-up transformed the foreign ministries and embassies in London into mere relays for safe information exchange with the capitals. Monnet's objective was never a particular institutional form ('supranational' or otherwise), however, but to achieve the highest possible degree of autonomy for effective informal and 'rational' cooperation. identify what might conceivably be in the 'common interest of all' -defined as decisions geared towards winning and shortening the war. The British government prioritised food supplies to industrial workers, which were kept at pre-war levels, as it feared more strikes and ultimately, socialist revolution. 29 The French government was more concerned with the morale of its soldiers, the possibility of large-scale mutinies and the collapse of the Western Front. The preferences of Monnet as a generalist decision-maker for autonomous executive governance in European cooperation were not unique, however. Instead, they were embedded in a strong tradition of technocratic internationalism which had its roots in the nineteenth century. 37 This tradition created a crucial trajectory into the Western Europe of the 1950s.
Monnet's cooperation preferences and practices had already characterised much of the work of transnational voluntary and international organisations in the nineteenth century.
Intellectually, it had many sources including Saint-Simonism which appealed to many experts from engineers to political economists with specialist knowledge within France and beyond. 38 Experts who worked in and for organisations like the International Telegraph Union and the Universal Postal Union, for example, largely shared three key assumptions about how best to tackle such transnational issues. First and foremost, informed by the growth of technology and science and the experience of industrialisation and its social consequences, they advocated scientifically informed policy-making by themselves within agreed parameters of evolving knowledge about the issues at stake. Secondly, these experts also believed -like Monnet in
London during the First World War -that de-politicising issues through rational deliberation in committees would allow consensual agreement on optimal policy solutions. In their view diplomats were trained to treat international negotiations as zero sum games in which one state gains at the expense of another. In contrast, they were working towards what Monnet called the 'common interest'. Consequently, experts working at international level including in the steel sector, where they often had a mixed technology and business background, regarded diplomats as adversaries in international relations. As a result, they -thirdlysought to create the greatest possible space for policy deliberation and decision-making for themselves and to limit the influence of foreign ministries -a notion that was to become influential in post-war Western European integration starting with the ECSC.
Transnational Cartels for Progress and Peace
The well-established transnational cartel practices constitute the second element that helps explain continuities in the European governance of the steel sector across the two world wars.
The cartel practices favoured informal over formalized cooperation and sought to maximize industry influence and minimize what companies regarded as interference by governments.
As reflected in the initial scepticism of steel companies towards the Schuman Plan, this tradition sat uneasily with Monnet's attempt to build a new kind of formal institution with the High Authority with strong legal powers, but both were connected through the shared belief in autonomy and rational decision-making by experts.
Tthe steel industry had actually started the European habit of cooperation in transnational cartels when companies first formed a rails cartel in 1884 in response to the rapid slow-down in the expansion of the European railway network since the 1870s. By the time of the First World War, some 100 transnational cartels were operating in various economic sectors in Europe. 39 Some were geared towards preventing competition in domestic markets while others also divided up export markets and set sales prices.
In highlighted their dangers and demanded some form of national or international regulation.
After controversial discussions even the most ardent cartel advocates nevertheless supported
Lammers' proposal for a compromise resolution. It refused to take sides in the debate and argued that cartels could be 'good or bad' depending on their intentions. They had potential for a more rational organisation of companies, which could create stable conditions for industrial research, investments and production. This in turn could also foster stability for employment in the interest of workers. At the same time, the resolution drew on socialist arguments in warning that cartels could also strengthen 'monopolistic tendencies', keep prices unnaturally high, and prevent technical progress. 44 Salter coordinated the League's subsequent work on cartels. He argued that the prevalent US preference for strong competition rules to protect consumers and small businesses had very limited support in continental Europe, where the cartel movement was becoming ever more influential. 45 In fact, when three legal reports on international cartels commissioned by the League Secretariat recommended international regulation of some kind or another, Lammers and business interests strongly lobbied for a much more positive League stance on cartels. 
Technocratic internationalism in the European Coal and Steel Community
Steel was a crucial commodity for the reconstruction of industry and infrastructures in (Western) Europe after 1945. All international organisations created steel committees to address issues such as the efficient allocation of scrap to increase overall output. 54 The sector expanded so much, however, that it might have faced a first overproduction crisis had it not Christian Democratic Union largely depended on it for its party funding.
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In addition to the national route of lobbying, the steel industry secured transnational influence on ECSC policy-making in two crucial ways. First, it largely controlled the hiring of industry experts for key High Authority departments, especially the Market Division, where Rollman had a congenial collaborator in the Director for Coal, the German Hermann Dehnen, who had worked for the domestic German coal cartel from 1933 to 1945 and had continued his career in the German coal industry after the war. 63 Industry concertation was also very close in the Consultative Committee. Although it had mixed membership including representatives from the trade unions and steel-consuming industries, the steel industry delegates had closer networks, enjoyed longer mandates and were able to dominate the institution.
The committee had consultative rights on paper only. In reality, relations not only between national governments, but also the High Authority and steel producing interests were very close including at the level of leading officials who regularly attended the monthly meetings of the Consultative Committee. When he took part in meetings of the Consultative Committee
Monnet regularly highlighted that its members were appointed in a personal capacity; that they should never adopt a 'national viewpoint'; that the High Authority was interested in their 'knowledge and ideas'; and that as a result, they should not bother with internal regulations or voting procedures, but keep their work and cooperation with High Authority officials as informal as possible.
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Contrary to Monnet's preferences, however, the Consultative Committee quickly began to involve experts from companies, national associations, and trade unions. It also adopted elaborate internal regulations and voting procedures and practices. Moreover, the High Authority's links with business interests were so close that it effectively delegated some decision-making to the Consultative Committee. This concerned, for example, the allocation of ECSC co-funding for research. For a long time this funding was not distributed as a result of a competitive process, but more or less proportionately to national projects of member states, associations and companies. 65 The cartel tradition, therefore, became embedded in the ECSC governance patterns through the High Authority's staff policy, with hiring of industry experts effectively controlled by coalescing national governments and industry associations; and through industry influence via the national route and the Consultative Committee. Far from implementing a more forceful competition policy, the High Authority actually fostered the re-concentration of the German and European steel industry. 66 By 1958 the High Authority had dealt with 104 cases, 46 from Germany, and it prohibited not one of the proposed mergers and acquisitions. 67 In fact, the High Authority argued, as transnational cartels had done before, that these concentrations were healthy because they facilitated rationalisation and modernisation. 68 The institution's economic growth ideology of achieving productivity gains through concerted action in practice actually required close collaboration with the industry which Monnet had initially sought to avoid.
The High Authority also made no effort to stamp out the cartel tradition more thoroughly. In 1953, the first year of the ECSC's existence, the steel producers immediately formed a transnational export cartel that agreed prices for the export of steel to third markets like Sweden. When the High Authority got wind of this arrangement, Monnet announced that it would have to check its compatibility with the treaty, only to conclude that it did not seem to rule out such export cartels.
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From the 1960s onwards, ordo-liberal notions of competition gained ground in the European
Economic Community created in 1957-8 where they were far less opposed in more internationalised and export-oriented sectors. In contrast, the High Authority actually tolerated a domestic ECSC steel cartel in 1966, which was obviously illegal under the treaty.
Just after the 'empty chair' crisis, when the French government had boycotted Council of Ministers meetings for six months, the political atmosphere in the EEC was so heated that the High Authority did not dare to draw on its own powers to address the problems of the steel industry, which at that stage still seemed to be of a cyclical nature only. 70 When the severe steel crisis started in 1974, the European Commission eventually took recourse to Article 58 and enforced production quotas and imposed import restrictions. Both of these were wellestablished cartel practices only now imposed by the Community's executive institution.
These measures were agreed in a neo-corporatist negotiation system now dominated by the even greater collusion of government and company interests after most member states had nationalised individual steel companies or, as in the case of the United Kingdom in 1967, the entire sector. 71 It was only in 1981 that the Community, as part of a larger informal package deal, finally began to tackle the issue of state aid, starting a tedious restructuring process which took well into the 1990s.
Conclusion
Narratives From a pluralist democratic perspective, finally, Monnet's vision had a pronounced antidemocratic streak. 'Rational' analysis and decision-making by unelected individuals in a formally autonomous institution may or may not produce good legislation and regulation (or 'output') with resulting increases in the welfare and happiness of citizens. Crucially, however, Monnet's approach created a technocratic trajectory that made it more difficult to enhance the democratic quality (or 'input') of the European Community's decision-making process when concerns about its institutional structure and legitimacy grew in the 1970s.
.
